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he mega-trends of digitalisation and automation have already changed labour markets 
and value chains around the world, with their inevitable economic and social 
consequences. And the pace of change is accelerating; job markets and skills 
requirements are evolving faster than traditional labour market practices and institutions. But 
what exactly are these changes, and how will governments, industry leaders, social partners 
and workers react to them?  
The current Commission has initiated substantial research and analysis into the topic, and the 
next incumbents should decide how to take this research forward. In order to make informed 
decisions, policymakers should bear in mind a number of issues. 
To begin, the jobs of today require constant ‘up-skilling’ to stay 
abreast of new technologies and business strategies. No longer can 
one leave education and perform the same job forever. Employers, 
social partners and governments are engaged in dialogue to find 
suitable policies to ensure workers retain an up-to-date skillset. A 
key question remains: who is responsible for funding such initiatives – employers, 
governments, social partners, or some combination of actors? 
Moreover, the types of jobs now in demand require new skillsets. This is forcing educators to 
re-evaluate mandatory courses, with an emphasis on developing digital proficiencies at an early 
age. In fact, CEPS research has found that job ads, even for traditional, lower-skilled professions 
demand at least basic digital skills (Beblavý et al., 2016).1 Mastering such skills is thus important 
regardless of industry, experience or age. 
1 See “Demand for Digital Skills in the US Labour Market: The IT Skills Pyramid”, https://www.ceps.eu/node/12055. 
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Despite efforts to improve education and training, many tech firms in Europe still face 
significant challenges to find enough qualified workers. Filling the demand for skilled labour is 
likely to remain a key policy challenge for the foreseeable future. Yet failing to do so would 
mean that Europe will miss out on an excellent opportunity for economic growth and 
technological innovation. 
Furthermore, digitalisation and automation mean that mainstays of the job market are less 
secure than before. While there is little consensus on the magnitude of these effects, it is clear 
that labour markets are adjusting and old jobs are disappearing, as new types of jobs emerge. 
More sophisticated IT systems are allowing more complex processes to be automated. 
Outsourcing is easier than it has ever been and is even possible for individuals at a micro level. 
For processes that cannot be automated or outsourced, many firms favour contracting work 
out rather than hiring new employees. This has resulted in a significant increase in self-
employment in many of Europe’s largest labour markets, notably Germany. 
For these reasons, ongoing efforts at EU level aim to secure minimum labour and social 
protection rights for people in new or atypical forms of work. 
For instance, last April, the Parliament reached a final 
agreement on transparent and predictable working 
conditions regardless of workers’ employment status and 
contract duration. This represents an important step 
towards workers' protection in the digital economy, which 
the next Commission could use as a cornerstone to develop 
its action in this field. 
The trade-offs regarding EU action to take up the opportunities of digitalisation in the labour 
realm are twofold. Significant investments in skills would require allocation of EU funds at the 
expense of other components of industrial policy. Yet, we still lack a clear understanding of the 
skills required in the next decades, given the fast pace of technological developments. 
Moreover, while employment legislation must develop and adapt to labour market changes 
and ensure that digitalisation fairly delivers benefits to all workers, growing regulation may 
hamper the development of digitalisation’s potential for both economic growth and social 
innovation.  
While these transformations affect the European labour market, the EU faces a profound crisis 
on several fronts, which has even led it to reconsider its role in promoting EU citizens’ social 
rights and living standards. In this regard, the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) was a 
flagship initiative of the Juncker Commission to give the EU a stronger social face, intended to 
balance the Economic and Monetary Union with a social dimension, promoting inclusion and 
fairness along with economic growth (Lorcher and Schömann, 2016; Muñoz, 2019).  
Adopted in November 2017, the EPSR is rather weak in terms of the outcomes generated. The 
time left until the end of the Juncker Commission mandate was indeed too short to deliver 
concrete actions in a field where the EU is progressively but still timidly assuming a role that 
goes beyond its traditional proclamations and values. The Social Fairness Package of March 
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2018, including a proposal for a European Labour Authority, a Council recommendation on 
access to social protection for all workers and the self-employed, and a communication on 
monitoring the implementation of the EPSR, was the first step 
towards concrete legislative and coordination action after the 
EPSR proclamation. These proposals are currently under 
discussion, together with the possibility to establish a European 
Social Security Number, as was announced as a follow up to the 
implementation of the EPSR.  
Although the Juncker Commission has concluded its mandate with 24 out of 27 proposals 
passed in the social field, it was impossible for Parliament to reach an agreement on 
modernising EU social security legislation. This remains a key open chapter in the handover 
concerning social priorities for the next Commission and Parliament. 
To keep the aims of a ‘social Europe’ on track, the key challenge for the next Commission and 
Parliament will be to transform the 20 principles of the EPSR into implementable actions. If it 
fails to do so, this important document will gather dust and not impact EU citizens’ lives.  
The first step would be to come up with the solid justification, supported by the empirical 
evidence wherever possible, of the necessity and opportunity of the EU social dimension, 
because this is still controversial. Member states are still reluctant to allow the Union to 
encroach upon this traditionally national competence.  
In addition, to move from declaration to delivery, it is necessary to undertake a careful 
assessment of the instruments that the EU could put in place to pursue the EPSR principles. 
While EU legislation2 already promotes some of these, further EU funds and budget allocation 
could be the key to creating the conditions for these principles to translate into practice. For 
principles that are already assigned EU co-funding to complement member state policy, 
however, further EU coordination by means of hard and soft EU law could serve to strengthen 
and harmonise the implementation of such principles at national level. Fine-tuning the EU 
instruments to implement the EPSR, and their optimal combinations, is an important challenge, 
which requires significant ad hoc research, continuous feedback mechanisms from civil society 
and social partners, and a constructive political debate. Yet, it remains the key to successful 
implementation, avoiding disappointment and a waste of resources. 
However, part of the challenge of implementing the EPSR and building common EU ground for 
social policy relies on overcoming heterogeneity between the member states in this field. A key 
strategic decision could be to determine whether the way forward is to aim for harmonisation 
(or at least continuous upward convergence) or rather to acknowledge and preserve this 
heterogeneity and put in place concrete actions to limit negative phenomena such as social 
dumping and so-called benefit tourism that discredit the Social Europe project.  
 
2 An overall picture of the EU legislation to promote social rights is reported in the EC Staff Working Document on 
The EU social acquis, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52016SC0050&from=EN.  
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Finally, the challenge is about taking into consideration the ongoing changes in the labour 
market while putting in place implementation measures to ensure that these measures are well 
designed for any eventuality. Promoting a horizontal approach to social protection and 
addressing people’s social rights before, during and after working life, the EPSR seems 
consistent with the changing nature of work and, specifically, with the need to ensure social 
protection in self-employment and non-standard forms of employment, which are growing 
apace in the European labour force. Yet this makes its implementation even more ambitious 
and would require a profound change in national social protection systems that may encounter 
additional obstacles. 
Ratcheting up EU action in the field of social rights from principles to delivery, including 
strengthening the coordination of national legislations, would inevitably result in trade-offs. 
These include limiting, to some extent, member states’ sovereignty in subjects such as 
education, employment and social protection, which are strategically important in defining the 
social contract at national level. On the other hand, defining the most adequate instruments 
and their financial capacity to deliver on an ambitious social agenda would require the 
alignment of budget allocations towards social priorities, at the expense of others that have 
historically been at the core of the EU’s funding system. This suggests a key upcoming 
discussion for the new multiannual financial framework and its revised structure.  
In pursuing empowerment, fairness and social inclusion, the EPSR pays specific attention to 
gender equality and equal opportunities, which, in spite of considerable action undertaken at 
EU level, still seem to require extra efforts to achieve an equal European society for men and 
women.  
Indeed, in recent decades, the EU has already put in place several instruments to promote 
gender equality3 and has constantly monitored the gender issue in the labour market 
(European Union, 2015). However, considering the still-high gender pay and employment gaps 
in all EU member states (European Union, 2018), it is clear that such efforts have not delivered 
satisfactory results.  
To trigger deeper change in the labour market and in society at large, growing attention has 
been paid to moving beyond equal treatment and non-discrimination and towards promoting 
inclusion and diversity. This requires understanding and accepting differences, as well as 
adjusting to different needs and attitudes at work, to support and facilitate women’s 
employment.  
The next EC and EP will need to incorporate this new concept in their labour and gender policies 
to strengthen and boost its actions in this field. This will require transversal and coordinated 
efforts that go beyond purely labour market interventions and will involve every aspect of 
society if they are to address embedded social norms and rules. Policies in this direction require 
 
3See for example the Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and 
equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX: 32006L0054&from=EN.  
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a long timeframe to assess impacts, which make them hard to plan carefully, evaluate and thus 
defend. Yet such actions are needed to eradicate the roots of gender inequality that are 
ultimately behind sexual harassment and violence in European society. 
European Unemployment Insurance 
While Europe is slowly recovering from one of its most severe crises, there have been 
widespread calls for reform. These calls have focused on the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), whose fundamental weaknesses were exposed in the global financial crisis of 2008 and 
subsequent eurozone crisis. With the inception of the EMU, countries lost control over their 
monetary policy, which is now managed centrally. National fiscal policy has remained in place 
and has widely been believed to gain in importance as a mechanism to prevent economic 
shocks and mitigate their impact on employment and incomes. Yet during the crisis, this 
combination of monetary and fiscal policy fell short. Other instruments, including labour 
mobility or wage flexibility, were not so powerful either. Market failures, current account 
imbalances and spillover effects raise additional concerns. 
While there is broad expert agreement that the EU (or at least the eurozone) would benefit 
from a macroeconomic stabilisation function and the Five Presidents’ Report gave this 
argument political support, there has been no decisive action by the Juncker Commission on 
either the European Unemployment Benefit System (EUBS) or any other form of stabilisation 
instrument. The new Commission should move this issue forward and either take action or put 
it to rest. 
In the report by Beblavý and Lenaerts (2017), the authors concluded that a EUBS would 
complement rather than substitute the other instruments and market mechanisms. A EUBS 
could be designed in many ways to achieve specific policy objectives. A fundamental distinction 
is that between the equivalent and genuine EUBS variants. Both the genuine and equivalent 
EUBS variants have their merits, and the choice of one of them would be based on political 
grounds. 
A genuine EUBS pays out benefits directly to any eligible unemployed individual, collects 
contributions from employers and employees (who contribute an equal share) and functions 
continuously. These variants would Europeanise the existing national schemes and thus require 
considerable harmonisation among them. Harmonisation and minimum standards would be 
essential for the stabilisation capacity of the EUBS and would help to mitigate moral hazard.  
Equivalent EUBS variants function very differently: all financial transfers would occur between 
the supranational fund and the member states (which would only receive a pay-out when the 
EUBS is triggered). The equivalent EUBS would thus ‘reinsure’ the existing national 
unemployment benefit schemes (NUBS). Equivalent EUBS could leave a lot of flexibility to 
member states, but crucially this would depend on how far conditions are imposed on 
governments’ scope to spend the funds received from the supranational fund and whether 
there are minimum standards for the NUBS. 
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A EUBS could contribute to macroeconomic stabilisation and efforts to address unemployment, 
encourage labour mobility, stimulate upward convergence and support the further 
development of a ‘Social Europe’ along several dimensions. In general, the stabilisation impact 
of EUBS is found to be fairly limited due to the small scale of 
the scheme (which would typically be less than 1% of EU GDP) 
(Beblavý and Lenaerts, 2017). Equivalent EUBS variants 
generally perform better in stabilisation terms than genuine 
EUBS variants. This finding can be explained by the focus of the 
equivalent EUBS on the crisis years, while a genuine EUBS 
would operate continuously.  
Therefore, the key trade-off for a EUBS is not between overall anti-cyclical impact and 
interference in member state sovereignty on social policy. A well-designed equivalent scheme 
can be effective and create minimal interference. The trade-off is rather with visibility; where 
the genuine EUBS provides visible Europeanisation of unemployment insurance for individuals, 
it also requires a much higher level of intervention in national systems.  
Labour mobility and migration 
The last decade saw a doubling of intra-EU labour mobility. The free movement of persons is 
one of the key pillars of the Union, but growing mobility also brings challenges – e.g. attempts 
by some member states to limit social benefits to foreign workers; and also potential solutions 
– namely a successful proposal by the Commission to establish European Labour Authority. In 
June 2019, the regulation to establish ELA was formally adopted, establishing the Authority 
with a seat in Bratislava, an annual budget of approximately 50 million EUR, and planned rollout 
in October 2019. 
The European Labour Authority is an ambitious idea with fundamental objectives such as the 
facilitation of information access for individuals and employers, supporting cooperation 
between member states in the enforcement of cross-border 
Union law, and mediating solutions in cases of cross-border 
disputes. As the European Labour Authority is not yet fully 
operational, it will be during the mandate of the next 
Commission that the organisation takes full shape. It is thus 
important to maintain momentum if the new organisation is 
to meet its expectations in the coming years. 
ELA now has its formal mandate, so we can see how potential trade-offs were resolved in its 
establishment. Principally, the Authority was established with a mandate to collect and 
exchange information as well as to coordinate member state responses. In other words, it has 
a much weaker mandate than, for example, the EBA and EMA. 
As regards the migration of third country nationals, most of the debate in Europe revolves 
around refugees and the disagreements about burden-sharing across member states. The 
experience of a rescue boat (Aquarius) carrying more than 600 refugees denied entry by Italy 
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and Malta again showed the diverse attitudes of current governments towards third country 
nationals, even when they migrate for humanitarian reasons. Therefore, it is very important 
that migration and asylum policies are agreed at the European level, where each member state 
takes its fair share of the burden.4  
While arrivals of asylum-seekers have decreased compared to the peak of 2015, the challenges 
of successful integration of refugees into the labour markets and social life of host countries 
are ever present. Migrant women especially lag behind in participating in the labour market 
and social life in general. Language barriers persist despite efforts to counter them. To this end, 
targeting integration at the local level (e.g. at the city or municipality) could be a way forward. 
Moreover, despite the varying reasons for migration (family, economic or study), the foreign-
born populations in Europe also face integration challenges as differing experiences of 
employment (e.g. in terms of wages and employment rates) compared to native-born workers 
persist, albeit to differing degrees across member states. All in all, migration issues pose a 
trade-off to member states (at least to some): on the one hand, failing integration risks putting 
pressure on member states and drives extreme political discourse. On the other hand, an 
ageing workforce and growing skills shortages in various sectors imply that Europe will need a 
further injection of migrants in the future for the smooth functioning of its labour markets and 
sustainability of its social security systems, if other factors, such as sharp increases in female 
labour force participation do not materialise (Lutz et al., 2019). While migration issues remain 
national competence, the future Commission could facilitate the exchange of best practices 
and provide evidence-based recommendations to member states.      
Whatever the outcome of Brexit, the status of EU citizens working in the UK and of UK citizens 
working in the European Union will be an economically important and politically sensitive issue 
for years to come. A number of EU governments have unilaterally declared that UK citizens 
currently residing in their countries have nothing to fear, but how future migration flows 
between the UK and the European Union countries will be organised remains an open question. 
In principle, this is not an issue for the Union, but rather for national governments. However, 
the future Commission should at least consider coordinating an exchange of information and 
the policy response of national governments.  
Key priorities for the next Commission 
● Agree on the need, instruments and method to implement a European Pillar of Social 
Rights and a Social Fairness Package. 
● Advance the debate on European Unemployment Benefit System (or any other form of 
stabilisation instrument) and take action. 
● Ensure the European Labour Authority becomes established as a relevant actor. 
 
 
4 See Carrera, S. (2019), An Appraisal of the European Commission of Crisis, CEPS paperback:   
(https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/appraisal-european-commission-crisis/), Brussels. 
8 | AKGÜÇ, BAIOCCO, BEBLAVÝ & KILHOFFER 
 
References 
Beblavý, M. and K. Lenaerts (2017), “Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment 
Benefits Scheme”, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. 
Beblavý, M., B. Fabo and K. Lenaerts (2016), “Demand for Digital Skills in the US Labour Market: 
the IT Skills Pyramid”, CEPS Special Report, No. 154, CEPS, Brussels.  
European Union (2015), “Strategic Engagement for Gender Equality 2016-2019”, Luxembourg: 
Publications Office of the European Union. 
European Union (2018), 2018 Report on equality between women and men in the EU, 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. 
Lörcher, K. and I. Schömann (2016), “The European Pillar of Social Rights: Critical Legal Analysis 
and Proposals”, ETUI Research Paper - Report 139. 
Lutz W, Amran G, Belanger A, Conte A, Gailey N, Ghio D, Grapsa E, Jensen K, et al. (2019), 
“Demographic Scenarios for the EU – Migration, Population and Education”, EUR 29739 
EN, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg. 
Muñoz, S. (2019), “Striking a balance between competitiveness and social fairness: what can 
we expect from the European Pillar of Social Rights?”, in Chiocchetti P. and F. Allemand, 
eds., Competitiveness and Solidarity in the European Union: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 
Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
 CEPS ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
ABOUT CEPS 
Founded in Brussels in 1983, CEPS is widely recognised as the most experienced and 
authoritative think tank operating in the European Union today. CEPS acts as a leading forum 
for debate on EU affairs, distinguished by its strong in-house research capacity and 
complemented by an extensive network of partner institutes throughout the world. 
Goals 
 Carry out state-of-the-art policy research leading to innovative solutions to the 
challenges facing Europe today 
 Maintain the highest standards of academic excellence and unqualified independence  
 Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process 
 Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations 
Assets 
 Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable 
analysts 
 Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research 
expertise and to extend its outreach 
 An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding 
board for the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Finance 
Regulation 
Rights 
Europe in the World 
Energy and Climate Change 
Institutions 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Energy Climate House (ECH) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Network of Economic Policy Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
